

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

10 July 1981

NOTE FOR:

FROM : A/NIO/W

SUBJECT : Agenda for June NIC Warning
Meeting

Attached agenda is for your information.

Attachment

NFAC #4272-81
9 July 1981

NIC WARNING AGENDA FOR JULY

I. Lebanon

Assumptions:

The lifting of the three-month siege of Zahlah by Syrian forces and the incon-
clusive outcome of the Israeli elections have reduced the chances of an early Israeli-
25X1 Syrian military confrontation over Syria's SAMs in Lebanon. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Although the Arab Conciliation Committee's success in arranging the Zahlah
compromise has eased the situation, considerable potential remains for further tests
of strength in the next three months:

—Syria's apparent intention to use a Phalange renunciation of ties with
Israel to press for additional concessions in negotiations on political recon-
ciliation may prompt Bashir Jumayyil to revert to an intransigent position that
would deadlock the talks.

—Bashir's demands for Syrian security guarantees to the Phalange and for
further withdrawals of Syrian forces from confrontation lines may draw renewed
Syrian pressure.

—Syrian charges of Phalange violations of a renunciation of ties with Israel
could signal renewed confrontation. [REDACTED] has claimed that
any renunciation would have no effect because Phalange's relationship with Israel
is "essential" to the survival of the Christian community. 25X

—Syrian pressure on the Phalange for further concessions might prompt the
Israelis to renew agitation for restoration of the "status quo ante" in Lebanon.

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II. PolandAssumptions:

The Soviet leaders' anxiety over the possible outcome of the Polish party congress appears to have eased somewhat, and they may have concluded that there will be no sweeping changes in Polish leadership and policies. Although it is unclear whether the Soviets thought there was a reasonable chance that Kania could be removed at the Central Committee plenum on 9-10 June and the party congress postponed, Moscow's pressures last month were aimed at least at protecting hardliners in the Polish politburo from defeat in party elections. (Only 4 of the 19-man party leadership failed to be elected as delegates to the party congress).

A. After applying political warfare and deception tactics in May and June that resembled those used last November-December and in March-April, the Soviets grudgingly acquiesced in proceeding with the party congress—a shift signalled by the 28 June announcement of Gromyko's visit to Warsaw and the easing of the alarmist, menacing tone of Soviet propaganda.

—In May and June, Moscow orchestrated rumors in Eastern Europe that another Warsaw Pact summit would be convened before the Polish congress.

—The Soviets and East Europeans inspired reports claiming that Soviet military intervention was inevitable and predicting it would occur before the congress.

25X1 [redacted] claimed that military exercises would begin in early July.

—The Soviet letter of 5 June to the Polish Central Committee, with its oblique invocation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," was obviously intended to influence Polish elections and decisions.

B. The absence of mobilization and logistics preparations underscored the political warfare purpose of these intimidation tactics. 25X1 [redacted]

[redacted]

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25X1 from Moscow" which were designed to influence the situation in Poland. [REDACTED] 25X1

25X1 [REDACTED] in mid-June that Moscow had no plans for an imminent intervention and that it would await the results of the Polish congress before making a decision.

C. If, as seems likely, the Polish congress reaffirms a moderately reformist policy and avoids far-reaching changes in top leadership, this would strengthen the cautious, non-interventionist elements in the Soviet leadership. Continuing indecision and disagreement, however, was suggested by the failure to hold a Central Committee plenum before the 23 June Supreme Soviet session. If post-congress events in Poland should deepen these divisions, Soviet perceptions and intentions may become more difficult to judge and subject to rapid changes.

III. Iran

Assumptions:

The dismissal of President Bani-Sadr and the 28 June bombing of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) headquarters may trigger the most violent power struggle since the revolution. The consequences could include a vacuum of authority in Tehran and eventual Iraqi military attempts to take advantage of the chaos.

Alternative futures:

25X1 A. Beheshti's death may lead to an increasing factionalization of the IRP, resulting in the party's eventual collapse as an effective political force. According to reports and rumors [REDACTED] the bombing was carried out by a faction of the party led by Bahonar, who has since replaced Beheshti as party chief. The faction reportedly included Prime Minister Rajai and Majlis speaker Rafsanjani.

B. In an attempt to protect its predominant power, the IRP may launch even stronger repressive drives, thus provoking violent and sustained defiance by the Mujahedin, the Fedayin and other armed groups. Khomeini signalled a campaign against the Mujahedin by blaming it for the bombing.

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C. The Iranian army may be forced to intervene to halt destructive warfare between the mullahs and their challengers—a move that might propel the armed forces into seizing power in Tehran.

D. An outbreak of virtual civil war may tempt Saddam Hussein to reverse his intention to refrain from major offensive operations. Disarray in Tehran will at least mean an indefinite suspension of efforts by the Islamic Conference mediation committee to arrange a ceasefire and withdrawal of Iraqi forces. Both Tehran and Baghdad had demonstrated some flexibility last spring in moving toward a negotiating framework. But Bahonar, the IRP's new secretary general, has said Iran will not negotiate a settlement with Iraq and Tehran has rejected an Iraqi proposal for a ceasefire during Ramadan.

The Soviet Dilemma

Events in Iran almost certainly have increased Moscow's concern that a weakening of the Khomeini regime will provide opportunities for the Iranian army and other "counterrevolutionary forces" — perceived to be responsive to the West—to challenge clerical authority. Soviet propaganda has charged that the US was involved in the bombing of IRP headquarters in a bid to weaken the Khomeini regime: "The US administration expects that it will succeed in removing the IRP from power after Beheshti's death." [redacted] stated that Moscow has no choice but to support Khomeini because it fears that Iran will disintegrate without him. He acknowledged that the Tudeh party is numerically weak and could not be supported in any effective way by the Soviets.

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